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The ‘‘endowment effect’’ refers to the tendency to
place greater value on items that one owns—an
anomaly that violates the reference-independence
assumption of rational choice theories. We investi-
gated neural antecedents of the endowment effect
in an event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study. During scanning, 24 subjects
considered six products paired with 18 different
prices under buying, choosing, or selling conditions.
Subjects showed greater nucleus accumbens (NAcc)
activation for preferred products across buy and sell
conditions combined, but greater mesial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) activation in response to low prices
when buying versus selling. During selling, right insu-
lar activation for preferred products predicted indi-
vidual differences in susceptibility to the endowment
effect. These findings are consistent with a reference-
dependent account in which ownership increases
value by enhancing the salience of the possible loss
of preferred products.
INTRODUCTION
Why do people find it hard to part with their possessions? Ac-
cording to rational choice theory, ownership should not influence
preferences (Coase, 1960). Decades of behavioral research,
however, suggest that even when allocation occurs by chance,
people prefer items they own to similar items they do not own.
This phenomenon has been called the ‘‘endowment effect’’
(Thaler, 1980). From a standard economic perspective, the en-
dowment effect presents an anomaly, because it violates the
reference-independence assumption of valuation in rational
choice theories (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
While the endowment effect occurs regularly and robustly in
both laboratory and natural settings (Camerer, 2001), the psy-
chological and neural mechanisms underlying this effect remain
unclear. Researchers initially proposed that the endowment ef-
fect results from loss aversion, or the tendency to weigh losses
more heavily than gains of similar size (Kahneman et al., 1990,
1991). According to this account, while items to be bought are
typically considered as potential gains, ownership resets the
reference point so that items to be sold are instead considered814 Neuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.as potential losses. However, many alternative accounts have
been advanced, some of which propose that ownership causes
people to overestimate the positive features of an item, to under-
estimate the negative features of an item, or in a related vein, to
personally identify with the item (Beggan, 1992; Nayakankup-
pam and Mishra, 2005; Peters et al., 2003). Event-related func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) affords the possibility
of distinguishing between at least two reference-dependent
accounts of the endowment effect. People might find it difficult
to part with their possessions either because of enhanced attrac-
tion to the item (possibly based on familiarity) or simply because
of an aversion to potentially losing the item.
Prior event-related fMRI studies featuring second-to-second
temporal resolution have implicated a limited number of brain
regions in anticipation of gain and loss. Even in the absence of
choice, nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activation has been associ-
ated with prediction of monetary gain (Knutson et al., 2001a),
insula activation has been associated with prediction of mone-
tary loss (Paulus and Stein, 2006), and mesial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) activation has been implicated in updating initial predic-
tions of monetary gain (Knutson et al., 2003). Further, in choice
scenarios such as buying, NAcc activation correlates with prod-
uct preference and predicts purchasing, while increased insula
activation and decreased MPFC activation occur in response
to excessive prices and predict not purchasing (Knutson et al.,
2007). These findings suggest a dynamic and componential
process in which people weigh potential gains against potential
losses to inform upcoming purchasing decisions (Prelec
and Loewenstein, 1998). The findings also implicate distinct
neuroanatomical circuits in the enhanced attraction versus the
loss aversion accounts of the endowment effect. Specifically, if
people have enhanced attraction to products when selling
versus buying, they should show increased NAcc activation
when viewing those products. On the other hand, if people
have increased aversion to losing products when selling versus
buying, they might show increased insula activation when
viewing those products. Additionally, people should show de-
creased MPFC activation to low prices when selling (because
they represent a net loss) but should show increased MPFC
activation to low prices when buying (because they represent
a net gain).
In the present study, we aimed to elicit the endowment effect
by asking subjects to buy certain products, sell other products
(given to them before the experiment), and choose between yet
other products and cash (Figure 1). As subjects engaged in these
three tasks, we scanned them with fMRI to determine whether
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Neural Antecedents of the Endowment Effectactivation in regionsof interest duringbuying versus sellingwould
replicate andextendfindings fromaprevious studyof buyingonly
(Knutson et al., 2007). We also examined whether activation in
these regions could account for individual differences in suscep-
tibility to the endowment effect. Consistent with a loss aversion
account, we predicted that, during selling, insular activation in re-
sponse to products might magnify the endowment effect. Based
on behavioral evidence that the endowment effect reverses for
undesirable items (Brenner et al., 2007) and is diminished for neu-
tral versus desirable items (controlling for price) (Carmon and
Ariely, 2000), we also predicted that this association might hold
most powerfully for ‘‘high preference’’ (or desirable) products.
Figure 1. Task Trial Structure and Regres-
sors
For trial structure (across Sell, Choose, and Buy
conditions), subjects saw labeled products (prod-
uct period; 4 s), saw an associated price (price
period; 4 s), chose either the product or price (by
selecting either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ presented randomly
on the right or left side of the screen; choice pe-
riod; 4 s), and then fixated on a crosshair (2–6 s)
prior to the onset of the next trial. In regression
models, preference was correlated with brain
activation during the product and price periods,
percentage retail price was correlated with brain
activation during the price period, and choice of
the product versus price was correlated with brain
activation during the choice period.
Figure 2. Choice Behavior
Mean indifference points (percent retail price ± SEM), reaction times (averaged across both products in each condition ± SEM), and correlation of scanned versus
postscan endowment effect estimates (Sell – Buy indifference points; averaged across both products in each condition in units of percent retail price).
RESULTS
Behavior
As in previous behavioral studies (Kahne-
manetal.,1990),subjectsshowedarobust
endowment effect. The mean scanned
indifference point for the Sell condition
(65%±4%;willingness toaccept)wassig-
nificantlygreater than for theBuycondition
(32% ± 3%; willingness to pay), with the
Choose condition falling in between (45%
± 3%;ps < 0.001; Figure 2).Mean reaction
time did not differ for the Sell (1087.9 ± 45.87 ms) versus Buy
(1089.0 ± 48.03) conditions but was greater for the Choose condi-
tion (1491.2 ± 74.18; ps < 0.001; Figure 2), consistent with in-
creased responseconflict in theChoosecondition.Becauseantic-
ipatory affect should have the most distinct influences in the Sell
versusBuyconditions, and inorder to control for potential reaction
time confounds, primary analyses of neural data contrasted Sell
andBuy conditions, andaparametric regressormodeling reaction
timewas also included in neural analyses during the choice period
(Knutson et al., 2005).
Endowment effect estimates can be computed as the differ-
ence between the indifference point for selling (i.e., willingnessNeuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 815
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Neural Antecedents of the Endowment EffectFigure 3. Association of NAcc Activation with Product Preference
NAcc activation correlated with product preference (across all conditions; anterior = 9) and VOI time courses (high versus low preference; mean ± SEM; white =
lagged product period; *p < 0.05).to accept) versus buying (i.e., willingness to pay). Because sub-
jects did not encounter the same products in different conditions
in the scanner, both scanned and postscan estimates of the
endowment effect were computed. The scanned estimate was
computed as the difference between the indifference points for
selling a particular product versus the mean indifference point
for all other subjects who encountered that same product in
the Buy and Choose conditions. The postscan estimate was
simply computed as the difference between the self-reported
postscan indifference point for selling versus buying the same
product. Both the scanned estimate [26.26% ± 4.84%; t(23) =
5.42, p < 0.001] and the postscan estimate [10.15% ± 1.73%,
t(23) = 5.88, p < 0.001] were significantly greater than zero. The
scanned estimate was also significantly larger than the postscan
estimate [16.10% ± 4.00%; paired t(23) = 4.03, p < 0.01], consis-
tent with previous behavioral evidence that people underesti-
mate their susceptibility to the endowment effect in hypothetical
scenarios (Loewenstein andAdler, 1995). Thepostscanestimate,
however, did significantly correlate with the scanned estimate
(r = 0.62, p = 0.001) and was reliable across six products (Cron-
bach’s alpha=0.66), indicating that it providedavalid and reliable
within-subject index of the scanned estimate. Both estimates
were used in subsequent individual difference analyses. As ex-
pected, endowment effect estimates were greater for high-pref-
erence products than for low-preference products (p < 0.05,
one-tailed; see Supplemental Data section 2 available online).
Brain Activation
Localization
Parametric regressors tested for main effects across conditions,
while interaction regressors tested for differences in main effects
between Sell versus Buy conditions. Product preference corre-
lated with NAcc activation across all conditions (Figure 3), but
the interaction of product preference and Sell versus Buy condi-
tion did not correlate with activation in any of the volumes of
interest (VOIs). In contrast, price percent did not significantly
correlate with activation in any VOI across conditions, but the816 Neuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.interaction of price percent with Sell versus Buy condition corre-
lated with activation in the MPFC (Figure 4). Choice of the prod-
uct versus its associated price aswell as the interaction of choice
with Sell versus Buy condition did not correlate with activation in
any of the VOIs (Supplemental Data section 3). The regressor
modeling reaction time correlated positively with anterior cingu-
late, anterior insular, dorsolateral prefrontal, thalamic, and motor
cortical activation and negatively with amygdalar and parahippo-
campal activation across conditions, but the interaction of
reaction time with Sell versus Buy condition did not significantly
correlate with brain activation (Supplemental Data section 5).
Patterns of activation for nonspecific period regressors and their
interactions are listed in Supplemental Data section 4.
Comparison of activation time course data extracted from
NAcc and MPFC VOIs verified these localization findings (Fig-
ures 3 and 4). Pooled across all conditions, NAcc activation
was higher for high (rating R 5) versus low (rating < 5; based
on a median split) preference products during product presenta-
tion (p < 0.05, two-tailed; Figure 3). On the other hand, MPFC ac-
tivation for price percent during price presentation varied signif-
icantly as a function of condition. In the Buy condition, low price
percent elicited significantly greater MPFC activation than high
price percent (p < 0.05, two-tailed; Figure 4), while in the Sell
condition, low price percent elicited significantly less MPFC
activation than high price percent during price presentation
(p < 0.05, two-tailed). Direct comparisons of Buy and Sell condi-
tions revealed that MPFC activation during price presentation
was significantly greater for low price percent in the Buy versus
Sell condition (p < 0.05, two-tailed) and was significantly less for
high price percent in the Buy versus Sell condition (p < 0.05,
two-tailed; second acquisition only). While differences between
Sell versus Buy conditions demonstrated that MPFC activation
covaried with the subjective value rather than the objective mag-
nitude of prices, only direct comparisons of Sell versus Choose
conditions could establish a true framing effect, because these
conditions featured identical incentives (i.e., subjects could
choose either the product or its associated price in cash). Direct
Neuron
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MPFC activation correlated with the interaction of price percent and Sell versus Buy condition (right = 0) and VOI time courses by retail price percent (upper right =
Buy; lower left = Choose; lower right = Sell; mean ± SEM; white = lagged price period; *p < 0.05, paired t test of low versus high price).comparisons of Sell versus Choose conditions revealed that
MPFC activation during price presentation did not significantly
differ for high price percent (i.e., differing at a trend level only)
but was significantly greater for low price percent in the Choose
versus Sell condition (p < 0.05, two-tailed; first acquisition only),
demonstrating a true framing effect.
Individual Differences
Individual difference analyses correlated whole-brain parametric
and interaction regressor coefficients from the localization
model with estimates of susceptibility to the endowment effect
(i.e., both scanned and postscan). The regressor for the interac-
tion of product preference with Sell versus Buy condition corre-
lated positively with both scanned and postscan estimates of
endowment susceptibility only in the right insula. While the re-
gressor for the interaction of product preference with Sell versus
Buy condition correlated negatively with postscan estimates of
endowment susceptibility in the NAcc, this was not true for the
scanned estimate. Neither NAcc nor MPFC activation conjointly
correlated with both scanned and postscan estimates of the en-
dowment effect. Other regressors (i.e., product preference, per-
cent price, and the interaction of percent price with Sell versus
Buy condition) did not correlate with scanned and postscan
estimates of endowment susceptibility in any of the VOIs.
To statistically decompose this finding, right insula activation
(Talairach-defined, anterior to 0) during product presentation inSell and Buy conditions for high- versus low-preference prod-
ucts was extracted and correlated with both scanned and post-
scan estimates of endowment susceptibility. Because four sub-
jects did not encounter high-preference products in the Sell
condition, data from 20 subjects were included in analysis (i.e.,
15 subjects encountered one high-preference product in the
Sell condition, yielding 18 data points per individual estimate,
and five subjects encountered two high-preference products in
the Sell condition, yielding 36 data points per individual esti-
mate). In the Sell condition, average right insula activation in
response to high-preference products predicted both scanned
and postscan estimates of susceptibility to the endowment effect
(Figure 5), but this was not the case for activation in response to
low-preference products. In the Buy condition, average right in-
sula activation in response to high- and low-preference products
did not significantly correlatewith endowment susceptibility (Sup-
plemental Data section 8). No significant correlations were ob-
servedwithbothscannedandpostscan indicesof theendowment
effect when substituting activation from NAcc or MPFC VOIs.
DISCUSSION
We sought to determine whether neural activation associated
with buying would extend to selling and to identify neural ante-
cedents of the endowment effect. Localization analyses builtNeuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 817
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Neural Antecedents of the Endowment EffectFigure 5. Association of Insula Activation with Susceptibility to the Endowment Effect
Right anterior insula activation correlated with the coefficient for the interaction of product preference by Sell versus Buy condition for both scanned (top left) and
postscan (bottom left) estimates of individual differences in susceptibility to the endowment effect. Right insula VOI activation (Talairach-defined anterior > 0) for
preferred products in the Sell condition (lag = 6 s; ±SEM) also correlated with scanned (top right; Pearson r = 0.52; p < 0.05, two-tailed) and postscan (bottom
right; Pearson r = 0.39, p < 0.05, one-tailed) estimates of individual differences in susceptibility to the endowment effect (n = 20).upon and extended prior findings related to buying (Knutson
et al., 2007), because NAcc activation correlated with product
preference across both selling and buying conditions. MPFC
activation, on the other hand, correlated negatively with price
percent during buying but positively with price percent during
selling. Finally, during selling, right insular activation in response
to preferred products predicted individual differences in suscep-
tibility to the endowment effect. These findings provide insights
about neuropsychological mechanisms underlying the endow-
ment effect.
Consistent with a gain anticipation account (Knutson et al.,
2001a), NAcc activation correlated with product preference
and did not significantly differ across conditions (even at
a more liberal threshold; p < 0.01, uncorrected). Individual differ-
ence analyses did not reveal a significant association of NAcc
activation by condition with endowment effect susceptibility. If
anything, NAcc activation in response to preferred products dur-
ing selling versus buying was negatively rather than positively
correlated with susceptibility to the endowment effect. Together,
these findings do not support the hypothesis that enhanced
attraction to possessions promotes the endowment effect.
Consistent with a gain integration account (Knutson et al.,
2003), MPFC activation appeared instead to track net gain with818 Neuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.respect to the initial product estimate. Specifically, MPFC activa-
tion increased in response to low price offers for Buy products
but decreased in response to low price offers for Sell products
and decreased overall in response to Sell versus Buy prices
(Supplemental Data section 4). The dissociation in NAcc and
MPFC patterns of activation provides further evidence that acti-
vation in different dopamine target regions reflects distinct gain-
related computations at different steps of incentive processing
(Knutson and Wimmer, 2007) rather than all representing the
same unitary value (Tom et al., 2007). The dependence of
MPFC activation on Sell versus Buy condition also suggests
that this region tracks the subjective value rather than the objec-
tive magnitude of prices (Plassmann et al., 2007). MPFC activa-
tion also showed a true framing effect, because it was greater in
response to low prices in the Choose than in the Sell condition,
despite the fact that these conditions featured identical incen-
tives (i.e., a choice of either a product or an associated price)
(Loewenstein et al., 2008). This pattern of findings suggests
that neural predictors of buying may only extend to selling after
careful consideration of subjective valuation and framing effects.
Though predicted by a loss anticipation account (Buchel and
Dolan, 2000; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Sanfey et al., 2003), in-
sular activation did not correlate with the interaction of product
Neuron
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lar activation to preferred products in the Sell condition did pre-
dict susceptibility to the endowment effect (indexed by both
scanned and postscan estimates). This finding provides some
support for the hypothesis that insular activation in response to
preferred products may induce loss aversion (Kahneman et al.,
1991). The fact that this association is strongest for preferred
products is consistent with behavioral findings in this experiment
and previous behavioral findings suggesting that desirable items
evoke stronger endowment effects (controlling for price) (Bren-
ner et al., 2007; Carmon and Ariely, 2000). Unlike prior research
on buying (Knutson et al., 2007), insular activation did not corre-
late with prices or choices. This difference may stem from dis-
tinct features of the present research design, because subjects
saw the same product repeatedly at several different prices
and could develop a sense of price range, potentially minimizing
the negative impact of any single price offer (e.g., as often occurs
in the case of bargaining).
Consistent with reference-dependent theories (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991), these findings support the notion that antici-
pated gains and losses are processed by distinct neural circuits
that may exert different effects on subsequent choice (Knutson
and Bossaerts, 2007; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). Additionally,
output from these different circuits may sometimes come into
conflict prior to choice, because anterior cingulate activation
was greatest in response to prices close to the indifference point
over all conditions (Supplemental Data section 5; Botvinick et al.,
1999; Pochon et al., 2008). These findings support a loss aver-
sion account of the endowment effect for several reasons. First,
the association of NAcc activation with product preference did
not vary significantly by condition. If anything, NAcc activation
in the Sell condition was negatively correlated with susceptibility
to the endowment effect, contrary to an enhanced attraction ac-
count. Second, the association of MPFC activation with price
percent reversed as a function of Sell versus Buy condition (in
addition to showing lower activation overall in the Sell versus
Buy condition; Supplemental Data section 4). To the extent
that decreased MPFC activation reflects correction of initial
gain predictions, this pattern of results might indirectly support
a loss aversion account. Third, right insular activation predicted
two different estimates of individual differences in susceptibility
to the endowment effect, consistent with a loss aversion
account.
In a previous fMRI study of the endowment effect, subjects
stated buying and selling prices for digitally recorded songs
while being scanned (Weber et al., 2007). The investigators
reported increased amygdala and caudate activation when
subjects estimated selling versus buying prices, which they
interpreted as evidence for increased sensitivity to both product
loss andmonetary gain (respectively) while selling. In the present
study, direct contrasts of selling versus buying conditions overall
did not reveal these patterns of activation (Supplemental Data
section 3). Differences in findings between the present study
and the Weber et al. study may have resulted from differences
in experimental design and analysis. TheWeber et al. study com-
pared selling and buying price estimation, whereas the present
study compared selling and buying decisions. The Weber et al.
study’s analysis simply contrasted sell and buy conditions, whilethe present study’s analysis included both regressors of interest
that separately modeled different trial periods as well as
additional regressors that controlled for periodic confounds.
The Weber et al. study lacked a prediction component, whereas
the present study used anticipatory brain activation to predict
individual differences in susceptibility to the endowment effect.
Unlike the Weber et al. study, the present study was designed
to elicit anticipatory brain activation, which correlated more ro-
bustly with subsequent choice than did activation during choice,
similar to an earlier fMRI study of buying but not selling (Knutson
et al., 2007).
Other fMRI studies have not focused on the endowment
effect, but several have elicited neural responses related to ref-
erence dependence. In fact, much of the fMRI literature involving
monetary incentives bears relevance to reference dependence,
beginning with initial demonstrations of distinct (rather than op-
posite) neural responses during anticipation of gains and losses
of the samemagnitude (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a)
and of different neural responses to nongain versus neutral out-
comes (Berns et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001b). Later studies
examined neural responses to mixed gambles. For instance,
one study’s findings implicated orbitofrontal cortex (bordering
the MPFC) activation in decreased susceptibility to framing
effects (De Martino et al., 2006), while another implicated meso-
limbic activation (in regions including the MPFC) in increased
susceptibility to loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007). The designs
of these mixed-gamble studies did not permit investigators to
separate neural responses during anticipation of gambles from
neural responses during choice execution or in response to pos-
sible outcomes. Yet both the present findings and a growing lit-
erature clearly indicate distinct patterns of neural activation dur-
ing anticipation of gains versus in response to gain outcomes
(Knutson and Cooper, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004). In the present
study, framing effects were apparent in the MPFC but showed
specific sensitivity to price information. MPFC activation in-
creased when prices increased the net value of the associated
product and decreased when prices decreased the net value
of the associated product, consistent with gain integration
accounts of MPFC function (Knutson et al., 2003). Further, nei-
ther of these mixed-gamble studies separately modeled choice
or included an explicit feedback component. Yet the literature
suggests a clear influence of outcome-related feedback on
mesolimbic activation (Delgado et al., 2000; Poldrack et al.,
1999). In the present study, choice might be considered an
outcome, because it is incentive compatible and final for each
trial. Finally, as in the study of the endowment effect described
in the previous paragraph (Weber et al., 2007), these mixed-
gamble studies did not control for potential trial phase or reaction
time confounds, which might also influence activation in meso-
limbic regions. In the present study, reaction time robustly cor-
related with activation of the anterior cingulate and deactivation
of the amygdala across conditions (Supplemental Data sec-
tion 5), a pattern of neural responses also observed when
subjects chose gambles against the dominant frame (in the ab-
sence of statistical control for reaction time) (De Martino et al.,
2006).
Strengths of the current study include use of highly desirable
consumer products that command substantial retail pricesNeuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 819
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more commonly used items such as mugs or pens), incentive
compatibility (i.e., one decision for each of six products counted
‘‘for real’’), elicitation of a robust behavioral endowment effect,
and the use of brain activation to predict susceptibility to the en-
dowment effect. Additionally, the design elicited choices for the
same products across a range of prices, obviating the need to
employ a conceptually similar but less intuitive procedure com-
monly utilized in economics research (Becker et al., 1964). A
necessary weakness includes the utilization of individual differ-
ences, because it was psychologically implausible to ask sub-
jects to both sell and buy the same product in the same experi-
ment. However, a postscan (i.e., strictly within-subject) estimate
of the endowment effect correlated robustly with a scanned es-
timate of the endowment effect, and both implicated an overlap-
ping right anterior insular region in susceptibility to the endow-
ment effect. Indeed, future studies might profitably use similar
methods to explore mechanisms underlying these individual
differences (Harbaugh et al., 2001), because person variables
such as emotional attachment to items have been reported to
increase susceptibility to the endowment effect (Peters et al.,
2003) while expertise decreases susceptibility (List, 2003).
These neuroscience findings have implications for both psy-
chology and economics. Psychologically, the present findings
are consistent with mechanistic accounts in which positive and
negative affect flexibly guide decisions both to buy and sell (Pe-
ters et al., 2003), because product preference activated different
brain regions than anticipated product loss. Economically, these
findings provide evidence consistent with reference-dependent
theories (e.g., prospect theory) rather than reference-indepen-
dent theories (e.g., rational choice) and specifically support
a loss aversion rather than an enhanced attraction account of
the endowment effect (Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). While
products are viewed as gains when buying, theymay additionally
be viewed as losses when selling.
While many factors may contribute to the endowment effect
(Bateman et al., 2005), these findings provide support for one
mechanism involving increased aversion to loss of possessions
during selling but not for another involving enhanced attraction to
possessions during selling. In the future, methodological ad-
vances may enable investigators to examine potential contribu-
tions of other factors. Thus, neuroscience methods can advance
economic theory not only by breaking down apparently unitary
phenomena (e.g., choice) into constituent components (e.g., an-
ticipation of gain and loss) but also by specifying which of these
components matters when.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty-four healthy right-handed subjects (12 females) were scanned on a 1.5
T General Electric Signa Scanner. Subjects were excluded if they owned prod-
ucts similar to those in the experiment (listed below). Along with the typical
magnetic resonance exclusions (e.g., metal in the body), subjects were
screened for psychotropic drugs and ibuprofen, substance abuse in the past
month, and history of psychiatric disorders (DSM IV Axis I), prior to collecting
informed consent. Subjects were paid $40.00 for participating, received
$20.00 in cash to potentially buy products, and received two products
(randomly assigned) to potentially sell.820 Neuron 58, 814–822, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.Task
Subjects participated in a modified version of the Savings Hold Or Purchase
(SHOP) task (Knutson et al., 2007) while undergoing event-related fMRI scan-
ning. In addition to ‘‘Buy’’ trials, the modified version of the task also included
‘‘Sell’’ and ‘‘Choose’’ trials. During Buy trials, subjects saw one of two products
that they could buy (for 4 s), one of 18 prices (for 4 s), and spatially counterbal-
anced boxes (labeled ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’) that they could press to indicate
whether they wanted to buy the product at the displayed price or not (4 s). Dur-
ing Sell trials, subjects saw one of two products that they were given before the
scan (4 s), one of 18 prices (4 s), and spatially counterbalanced boxes that they
could press to indicate whether they wanted to sell the product at the dis-
played price or not (4 s). During Choose trials, subjects saw one of two prod-
ucts (4 s), one of 18 prices (4 s), and spatially counterbalanced boxes that they
could press to indicate whether they preferred the product or the displayed
price in cash. Because Choose and Sell conditions featured identical incen-
tives (i.e., acquire money or the product), any difference in response to the
two represents a true framing effect (Kahneman et al., 1990).
Two of six products (i.e., iPod shuffle, noise-cancelling headphones, iPod
alarm clock base, 2 gigabyte USB flash drive, digital camera, and wireless
mouse) were randomly assigned to each condition for each subject, counter-
balanced across conditions. All products commanded substantial retail prices
(mean retail price $70.57, range $35.00–$95.00) and were rated as highly
attractive on average to this sample (mean desirability from 1 to 7 = 4.55 ±
0.12). The 18 prices were pseudorandomly ordered and equally distributed
from 5% to 95% of retail price for each product. Extreme high and low prices
were always presented within the first four trials of each block to minimize an-
choring effects (Ariely et al., 2003). Buy, Sell, and Choose trials occurred in
pseudorandomly ordered blocks of six trials each, yielding 36 trials per condi-
tion, or 108 trials total (Figure 1). To ensure incentive compatibility and trial
independence, subjects were informed that only one choice per product
would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to count ‘‘for real.’’
Thus, subjects received the outcome of six of their choices. Subjects were
also informed that prices would appear in random order.
Subjects were first instructed in the task (Supplemental Data section 1) and
played a short practice session with different products and hypothetical
outcomes. Subjects were then tested for task comprehension and received
$60 in cash ($20 for purchasing, as well as $40 in compensation for the 2 hr
experiment) to keep throughout the scan. Next, subjects saw all products
(packaged) and received two randomly selected products to keep (for the
Sell condition), which they then placed in their locker.
After scanning, subjects rated their preference for and familiarity with each
of the six products (on 1–7 Likert scales). To obtain a measure of individual
differences in susceptibility to the endowment effect and because different
products were presented in different conditions, subjects then played a hypo-
thetical but otherwise identical version of the task featuring all six products in
both Buy and Sell conditions.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
Imageswereacquiredwitha1.5TGeneral ElectricMRI scannerusingastandard
birdcagequadratureheadcoil. Twenty-four4mmthickslices (in-plane resolution
3.75 3 3.75 mm, no gap) extended axially from the mid-pons to the top of the
skull, providingwhole-brain coverageandadequatespatial resolutionof subcor-
tical regions of interest (e.g., midbrain, NAcc, orbitofrontal cortex). Whole-brain
functional scans were acquired with a T2*-sensitive spiral in-/out- pulse se-
quence (TR = 2 s, TE = 40 ms, flip = 90) designed to minimize signal dropout
at the base of the brain (Glover and Law, 2001). High-resolution structural scans
were also acquired to facilitate localization and coregistration of functional data,
using a T1-weighted spoiledgrass sequence (TR=100ms, TE=7ms, flip = 90).
Analyses were conducted using Analysis of Functional Neural Images (AFNI)
software (Cox, 1996). For preprocessing, voxel time series were sinc inter-
polated to correct for nonsimultaneous slice acquisition within each volume,
concatenated across runs, corrected for motion, slightly spatially smoothed
tominimize effects of anatomical variability (FWHM= 4mm), high-pass filtered
(admitting frequencies with period <90 s), and normalized to percent signal
change with respect to voxel means for the entire task. Visual inspection of
motion correction estimates confirmed that no subject’s head moved more
than 2.0 mm in any dimension from one volume acquisition to the next.
Neuron
Neural Antecedents of the Endowment EffectData analysis proceeded through three sequential steps. The first step of
localization analyses established associations between brain activation in
volumes of interest and parametric variables with multiple regression. The
regression model included 14 orthogonalized convolved regressors. Three
unit-weighted period regressors contrasted product, price, and choice pe-
riods of each trial with all other time points in the experiment. Four regressors
of interest modeled product preference for all trials during the product period
(parametric), retail price percent for all trials during the price period (paramet-
ric), choice of the product versus the price for the choice period, and reaction
time during the choice period (parametric). Finally, seven interaction re-
gressors multiplied the contrast of sell versus buy trials by both period and
parametric regressors. For product preference and price percent, interaction
regressors facilitated detection of conditional effects. The regression model
also included 12 additional regressors of noninterest that modeled baseline,
linear, and quadratic trends for each of two blocks, as well as six degrees of
displacement due to motion. To examine parametric and interaction effects
in VOIs, a threshold of p < 0.01 (corrected for three comparisons) was applied
to averaged bilateral NAcc, bilateral MPFC regions, and right insula VOIs, while
a threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected was adopted for all other brain regions
(cluster criterion = three 4 mm cubic voxels).
The second step of time course analyses verified that brain activation in VOIs
significantly differed at the predicted time points. Brain activation was aver-
aged and extracted from 8 mm diameter spherical NAcc (±10, 12 ,–2) and
MPFC (±4, 46, –2) VOIs, centered on coordinates identified in earlier research
using a similar task (Knutson et al., 2007). Because the right insula VOI focus
shows more variability across studies, we defined a larger VOI as the entire
right insula in the Talairach atlas anterior to A = 0 (however, activation
extracted from a smaller right insula 8 mm diameter spherical VOI centered
on +32, 10, 9 yielded similar findings). Activation extracted from VOIs was
compared across conditions with within-subject paired t tests at a threshold
of p < 0.05, two-tailed.
The third step of individual difference analyses examined whether brain acti-
vation extracted from VOIs could predict individual differences in susceptibility
to the endowment effect (i.e., both scanned and postscan estimates) with mul-
tiple regression. The scanned estimate was derived by subtracting the scanned
indifference point for selling a product from all other subjects’ average indiffer-
ence points for buying and choosing the same product. The postscan estimate
was derived by subtracting the average self-reported postscan indifference
point for buying (i.e., willingness to pay) from selling the same products (i.e.,
willingness to accept) for each subject. In all cases, logistic regressions were
used toestimate indifferencepoints,whichwere computed in units of retail price
percent (Ariely et al., 2003).
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://www.
neuron.org/cgi/content/full/58/5/814/DC1/.
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